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WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW
24:3 Summer 1988
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL AND THE CONSTITUTION
By HAROLD H. BRUFF*
Separation of powers issues swirl around a current challenge
to the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978.1 The Act, passed in response to the abuses of Water-
gate, provides for the appointment of "special prosecutors" in-
dependent of the Justice Department to investigate and prosecute
serious crimes committed by high officials of the executive branch.2
* B.A., Williams College; J.D., Harvard Law School (Magna Cum Laude); John S.
Redditt Professor of Law, University of Texas.
This Article is adapted from remarks given at Willamette University College of Law,
October, 1987. I would like to thank the faculty and students at Willamette, and especially
Dean Robert L. Misner, for their hospitality.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 49 (1982); Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293 (to be codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 591-99), reprinted in 56 U.S.L.W. 39 (Feb. 2, 1988) [hereinafter 28 U.S.C.
§§ 591-99].
2. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824,
reauthorized and amended by Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983); Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub.
L. No; 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293. The amendments respond to perceived problems in the
administration or constitutionality of the Act. The important ones will be discussed in
context below. See infra notes 29, 31, 32 & 68 and accompanying text. Overall, the Act
retains its original structure. The 1982 amendments changed the title of "special prosecu-
tor" to "independent counsel," in order to "spare the subject of such investigation adverse
public reaction" and to avoid suggesting "that an indictment ... will be brought." S. REP.
No. 97-496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3537, 3554.
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In In re Sealed Case (Olson),3 the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals has invalidated the Act. The case involves the
refusal of former Assistant Attorney General Theodore B. Olson to
honor an independent counsel's subpoena, issued pursuant to an
investigation of allegations that Olson gave false testimony to a sub-
committee of the House Judiciary Committee.4 The constitutional-
ity of insulating prosecution from presidential control has been
uncertain from the Act's inception.' Indeed, the Justice Depart-
ment has taken both sides of the issue, now lining up with the
challengers.6
This Article explores the issues surrounding the Act, and con-
cludes that it is constitutional. After outlining the reasons for the
Act's passage and the nature of its principal provisions, I seek the
appropriate standard for constitutional analysis. Separation of pow-
ers cases feature two competing approaches, with sharply divergent
implications for the permissibility of such blended powers as the
Act creates. I first consider a formal analysis that emphasizes the
separation of powers. I conclude that formalism should be em-
ployed only when traditional concepts of political responsibility
3. 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988), prob. juris. noted sub. nom. Morrison v. Olson, 108
S. Ct. 1010 (1988).
4. Readers should know that from 1979-81, I was a Senior Attorney-Adviser in the
Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice. From January to June of 1981, Ted
Olson headed the Office. I have no personal knowledge of the events leading to the investi-
gation, all of which occurred after I left the Office. Of course, I take no position here on the
allegations under investigation. I do wish to say, though, that I formed both personal and
professional respect for Ted Olson in our brief time together. Knowing someone who is
subject to the ordeal of an investigation brings home the cost of a statute that I believe is
both constitutional and necessary. I hope that this Article adequately reflects an apprecia-
tion of that cost, and that Ted Olson will understand that I take my positions here despite
my personal feelings regarding him.
5. Passage of the 1978 Act was preceded by extensive hearings in several Congresses,
with testimony on the constitutional issue from many luminaries. See, e.g., Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
6. In 1973, Acting Attorney General Bork opposed the constitutionality of special
prosecutor legislation. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 251. Acting Assistant Attor-
ney General Harmon supported the constitutionality of the 1978 Act, 1977 House Hear-
ings, supra note 5, at 2, 19, reflecting the views of President Carter (Message to Congress,
May 3, 1977). In the current litigation, the Department filed an amicus curiae brief urging
invalidation of the Act. President Reagan signed the 1987 reauthorization of the Act, not-
ing his "very strong doubts" about its constitutionality and the fact of pending litigation to
resolve the question. Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, 23 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Docs. 1526, 1526-27 (Dec. 15, 1987).
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need to be honored, and that pursuit of executive misconduct is not
such a context. Turning to a functional analysis that emphasizes
checks and balances, I conclude that the Act is consistent with the
needs of both Congress and the executive, and with an appropri-
ately limited judicial role. Therefore, the Supreme Court should
uphold it.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. - The Problem at Hand
Miscreance at high levels is an enduring problem in our gov-
ernment. Four times in this century, major scandals resulting in
criminal prosecutions have plagued the executive branch.7 In the
Harding administration, a Secretary of the Interior was convicted
for participating in the Teapot Dome affair,8 and an Attorney Gen-
eral, accused of failing to prosecute the wrongdoers, was eventually
indicted in unrelated matters.9 In the Truman administration, cor-
ruption in revenue collection led to the eventual convictions of an
Assistant Attorney General of the Tax Division, the President's
Appointments Secretary, and a Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue.' ° In the Nixon administration, many of the "President's
men," including an Attorney General, were convicted of felonies."
Only the pardon of President Nixon mooted the question whether a
President himself may be indicted. Today, scandal again surrounds
many executive officials, including, some of the President's closest
associates-and another Attorney General.
The Act responds to a structural feature of the executive
branch that hampers prosecution of high-level misconduct. The
problem lies in the dual nature of the Attorney General's role. On
one hand, he is the nation's chief law enforcement officer, expected
7. For a historical summary, see In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34, 39-43 (D.C. Cir. Indep.
Couns. Div. 1987). The most famous nineteenth century scandal to touch the White House
was the Whiskey Ring in the Grant administration. See L. COOLIDGE, THE LIFE OF
ULYSSES S. GRANT 473-91 (1922).
8. Fall v. United States, 49 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1931); United States v. Fall, 10 F.2d
648 (D.C. Cir. 1925). See generally B. NOGGLE, TEAPOT DOME: OIL AND POLITICS IN
THE 1920's (1962).
9. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
10. See Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
921 (1958).
11. See generally R. WOODWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN
(1974); see also United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 933 (1977).
1988]
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to investigate and prosecute federal crimes 12 dispassionately. On
the other, as the administration's highest ranking legal adviser, 3 he
is ordinarily a political and personal confidant of the President and
his circle, providing advice on both law and policy. Therefore, alle-
gations of misconduct in high places often cast the Attorney Gen-
eral in the deeply troubling role of investigating close political and
personal associates.
Before passage of the 1978 Act, when scandal arose the execu-
tive appointed special prosecutors. The results were mixed. In re-
sponse to Teapot Dome, Congress authorized the appointment of
special counsel, who prosecuted the cases successfully.' 4 In the
Truman administration, Attorney General McGrath appointed a
special prosecutor to investigate the tax cases, fired him when he
requested access to the Attorney General's files, and was himself
promptly fired by Truman. No prosecutions resulted, however, un-
til the Eisenhower administration took office. In the Nixon admin-
istration, the famous "Saturday night massacre" occurred when the
Attorney General and his Deputy resigned rather than execute the
President's order to discharge Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox
for his investigation of the President.' 5 Public outrage forced the
appointment of Leon Jaworski to finish the task. To Congress, this
history demonstrated the need for a more permanent arrangement,
and the 1978 Act ensued.
B. Constitutional Tensions
Statutory special prosecutors present two kinds of constitu-
tional difficulties. First, prosecution is traditionally classified as an
executive function, and therefore within the "executive Power"
that Article II vests in the President. Indeed, the Constitution's
command that the President "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed"' 6 has been thought to place supervision'of prosecution at
the very core of executive power.' 7 One reason for this view is his-
torical: from the time of the framers, prosecutors have usually.been
12. 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 (1982).
13. 28 U.S.C. §§ 511-12 (1982).
14. H.R.J. Res. 160, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 43 Stat. 16 (1924).
15. See Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973).
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
17. See, e.g., The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att'y. Gen. 482 (1831)
(Taney) (President may direct United States Attorney to discontinue action to condemn
stolen jewels belonging to foreign monarch).
[Vol. 24:539
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executive officers." Another is functional: substantial discretion
necessarily attends the selection of targets of investigation and the
decision to bring charges to trial. Vesting that discretion in the
executive allows setting priorities and allocating resources 19 under
the "mass of legislation" that the President is charged to execute.2"
A final, powerful reason for allocating prosecution to the executive
lies in the purposes of our scheme of separated powers: tyranny
might ensue if legislators could both define and prosecute crime, or
if judges could both charge and adjudge guilt.2'
The second kind of constitutional issue is specific to prosecu-
tion of executive officers. Our law has long recognized that there is
a delicate balance between deterring official misconduct and vitiat-
ing official courage. The law of official immunity from tort dam-
ages addresses these tradeoffs.22 Many executive decisions must be
made under pressure of time and with uncertainty about both the
facts and the law. Those harmed by such decisions are apt to
ascribe evil motive and pursue retaliation.23 The Supreme Court
18. In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124 (1987), the
Court recognized a limited exception to this principle by upholding the power of federal
courts to appoint private attorneys to prosecute contempts of their orders. Justice Scalia
disagreed, arguing that the prosecution of law violators is vested in the executive. He noted
that notwithstanding an English practice of private prosecution at the time of the Constitu-
tion, since the Judiciary Act of 1789 the executive has controlled prosecution of federal
crimes. Id. at 2142 n.2 (citing Comment, The Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution, 25
AM. U.L. REV. 754, 762-64 (1976)).
19. The Supreme Court has held that agency decisions not to prosecute are presump-
tively unreviewable in court, Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act's category of actions "committed to agency discretion by law." 5
U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982). The Court emphasized the broad issues of priority-setting that
prosecutorial discretion involves, and alluded to "the decision of a prosecutor in the Execu-
tive Branch not to indict-a decision which has long been regarded as the special province
of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the executive who is charged by the Constitution
to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' " Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832.
20. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 702 (1952) (Vinson, C.J.,
dissenting) ("Unlike an administrative commission confined to the enforcement of the stat-
ute under which it was created .... the President is a constitutional officer charged with
taking care that a 'mass of legislation' be executed.").
21. "'Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator.
Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an
oppressor.'" THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 303 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (empha-
sis in original, quoting Montesquieu).
22. See generally Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
1110 (1981).
23. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 751-52 (1982) (explaining why the Presi-
dent, judges, and prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from tort damages for actions
within the scope of their official responsibilities).
WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW
now grants most executive officers immunity from damages absent
proof that they knew or should have known that they violated
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. 24 To foster
vigorous decisionmaking, the Court protects officers not only from
unjust awards of damages, but also from the jeopardy and expense
of trials.25
Traditionally, an officer's protection against excessive fear of
criminal prosecution has lain in executive branch control of the
process. If the President were shorn of all negative power over
prosecution of official misconduct, he might reasonably doubt
whether subordinates would execute their duties. Thus, control of
prosecution bears directly on the President's power over the execu-
tive branch, and the effective discharge of his constitutional duties.
C. The Ethics in Government Act
Plainly, the creation of independent prosecutors of official mis-
conduct presents high constitutional stakes, involving both the in-
tegrity and the effectiveness of our government. The Act is a
careful attempt to balance the competing considerations. It applies
to the President, the Vice President, the cabinet, and to senior offi-
cials in the White House, the Justice Department, the Central In-
telligence Agency, and the President's campaign committee. 26 It
directs the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investigation
upon receipt of information "sufficient to constitute grounds to in-
vestigate" whether a covered official has committed a serious fed-
eral crime.27 If the Attorney General determines that "there are
reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is war-
ranted," he or she must apply to a Special Division of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for the appointment of
an independent counsel.28 If, on the other hand, the Attorney Gen-
eral concludes that there are "no reasonable grounds" to warrant
24. Harlow & Butterfield v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
25. Id. at 818-19.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 591.
27. Id.
28. Id. § 592(c)(1)(A). The Act also authorizes the Attorney General to apply for the
appointment of independent counsel when the investigation of persons not covered "may
result in a personal, financial, or political conflict of interest." Id. § 591(c)(2). The Special
Division, created by 28 U.S.C. § 49, consists of three judges, one of whom must be from the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, appointed by the Chief Justice to serve for
two years. No member of the division may sit on a case involving an independent counsel
appointed during the judge's tenure on the division. Id. § 49(f).
[Vol. 24:539
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further investigation, he or she so notifies the Special Division, and
no appointment can be made.29
The Act directs the Special Division to define the jurisdiction
of an independent counsel to include the subjects specified in the
Attorney General's application, and "all matters related. ' 30  The
independent counsel then enjoys the full investigative and
prosecutorial powers of the Department of Justice, whose policies
the counsel must follow "except where not possible."3 The Attor-
ney General may remove the counsel "for good cause, . . ." and the
Special Division may terminate the office on grounds that the inves-
tigation has been "substantially completed ... 32
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS: THE CHOICE
OF ANALYTIC APPROACH
A. The Competing Standards of Review
Litigation over the constitutionality of this scheme, like other
separation of powers controversies, is marked by debate over which
29. Id. § 592(b)(1). Judicial review of the Attorney General's decision not to conduct
a preliminary investigation is barred. CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1987, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 452, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 21-22 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT] (codifying Dellums v. Smith,
797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986); Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
Although the Special Division may not overrule the Attorney General's determination, it
may "return the matter to the Attorney General for further explanation of the reasons for
such determination." 28 U.S.C. § 593(d).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(3). Upon the Attorney General's request, but not otherwise,
the Special Division may expand the jurisdiction of an independent counsel beyond these
parameters. Id. § 593 (c)(1). The counsel must ask either the Special Division or the Attor-
ney General for authority to pursue "related matters" within the original jurisdictional
grant. See 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 29, at 29.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f). The 1982 reauthorization of the Act substituted the quoted
phrase for the earlier directive to follow departmental policies "to the extent the special
prosecutor deems appropriate." S. REP. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1982), re-
printed in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3537, 3552. This change was meant
"to urge the special prosecutor to apply the uniform standards of the Department except in
extreme, extenuating circumstances." Id. The only power specifically denied the counsel is
to request wiretaps under 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1982).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1)&(b)(2). The "good cause" standard reflects "existing law
regarding officials subject to removal only for good cause." The conferees stated that the
standard incorporates a ban on removing counsel for defying presidential orders that would
compromise the integrity of the proceedings, such as an order to grant immunity to the
targets of the investigation. The conferees also removed provisions in previous versions of
the Act that specified a standard for judicial review of removals (whether "removal was
based on error of law or fact"), in hopes of clarifying that existing law was to apply here as
well. 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 29, at 36-37.
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of two analytic approaches should be employed.33 As elsewhere in
the law, choice of analytic style tends to determine the outcome of
the cases. The Supreme Court has often used a formalistic ap-
proach that reasons logically from the constitutional text and the
framers' acknowledged purpose to create three independent
branches with distinct functions.34 These cases tend to draw bright
lines between the responsibilities of the branches. The Olson major-
ity chose formalism and invalidated the Act.
The competing approach is a functional one that assesses the
needs of each branch for protection of its "core" constitutional
functions.35 These cases stress the framers' inclusion of checks and
balances, shared powers that aid the overall strategy of controlling
each branch and ultimately the government as a whole. 36  Func-
tional analysis therefore favors complex arrangements that blend
the powers of the branches, which formalism is likely to condemn.
The Olson dissent urged the consistency of the Act with functional
principles.
The Court has explained that formalism is appropriate for
cases presenting a threat that one branch will aggrandize itself at
33. For a general discussion of recent separation of powers controversies, see Bruff,
On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 491 (1987),
and the authorities cited therein.
34. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (invalidating the Comptroller
General's power to shape budget deficit reduction plans); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983) (invalidating legislative veto by either house of Congress over executive branch de-
portation decisions); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (invali-
dating seizure by the President of steel mills to avert impact of strike on steel production
during Korean conflict because of contrary statutory policy).
35. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986);
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 748-54; Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S.
425, 441-43 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-07 (1974).
36. Familiar examples of checks and balances include the President's participation in
legislation through his qualified veto and the Senate's participation in appointing executive
officers through its power to advise and consent. For each quotation from the framers that
emphasizes the need for strict separation of powers, there is another supporting checks and
balances. For example, after quoting Montesquieu on the necessity for separated powers in
The Federalist No. 47, Madison hastened to add that the "oracle" Montesquieu
did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no
control over the acts of each other ....
[He meant] no more than this, that where the whole power of one department is
exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another depart-
ment, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 21, at 302-03 (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 24:539
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the expense of another.37 Here, "good fences make good
neighbours. '3 8 In contrast, where a branch is alleged to have un-
dermined the power of another without expanding its own, func-
tionalism allows for the diverse structure that modern government
demands. Although this distinction helps to reconcile the Consti-
tution's competing themes, it has limits. Aggrandizement lies in
the eyes of the beholder. It reflects (often unarticulated) value
judgments about desirable allocations of power among the
branches. For example, is a legislative veto a congressional aggran-
dizement, or only an attempt to restore power lost to executive
usurpation?39 Beyond a broad principle that no branch should be
allowed to destroy the overall balance of powers, "aggrandize-
ment" may serve only to label conclusions that flow from other
values. But what are they?
B. Formalism in Service of Political Accountability
The Court may be choosing between formal and functional ap-
proaches according to perceived needs to clarify political accounta-
bility for executive action.' One effect-and I think a primary
benefit-of the Court's recent formalist decisions has been to draw
clear lines between legislative and executive responsibilities for eve-
ryday administration. In Buckley v. Valeo," the Court refused to
allow Congress to appoint executive officers. In INS v. Chadha,42
the Court invalidated the legislative veto, by which Congress had
sought to override executive action by means less formal than legis-
lation. And in Bowsher v. Synar,43 the Court forbade an officer re-
movable by Congress to perform executive functions. The result of
these three decisions is to place responsibility for the exercise of
delegated statutory powers squarely on the executive." In con-
37. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3261. See generally Strauss, Formal and Functional Ap-
proaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 488 (1987) (analyzing the Court's reasoning in Bowsher v. Synar and Schor concern-
ing the structure of the federal government).
38. R. FROST, Mending Wall, in NORTH OF BOSTON (2d ed. 1915).
39. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945 (citing proponents of the competing positions:
Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis,
52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455 (1977); Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of
Congressional Power, 68 VA. L. REV. 253 (1982)).
40. Bruff, supra note 33, at 500-06.
41. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
42. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
43. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
44. The framers' most prominent attempt to concentrate political accountability was
1988]
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trast, where the need to ensure political accountability is low, as for
adjudicative functions, the Court has approved insulation from ex-
ecutive supervision.45
C. The Limits of Political Accountability
Focusing on political accountability and its limits leads me to
favor the more flexible functional approach to the constitutionality
of the independent counsel statute. Investigation of high level mis-
conduct is fundamentally unlike ordinary administration, including
most prosecution. To see why, first we must consider administra-
tive law generally. Like the Court's formalist separation of powers
decisions, modern administrative law clarifies the political responsi-
bility of officers exercising statutory discretion.46 Judicial review
presses administrators to articulate policy choices clearly,4" where-
upon courts can verify their fidelity to statutory standards and the
administrative record the agency has compiled.4" Once courts have
made these inquiries, they are supposed to leave substantive poli-
cymaking to the executive.49 Two vital checks then remain-ac-
in their choice of a single rather than a plural executive. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at
424-25 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Hamilton argued that a plural executive
tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility....
•.. [It] tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for
the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first, the restraints of public opinion
which lose their efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure attend-
ant on bad measures among a number as on account of the uncertainty on whom
it ought to fall; and, second, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clear-
ness the misconduct of the persons they trust .... [so the people can remove or
punish them].
Id. at 427-29.
45. See Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3250, 3260 (CFTC was "relatively immune from the
'political winds that sweep Washington' ").
46. See generally Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29 (1985) (discussing a republican conception of government and how this conception
affects administrative law doctrine that responds to political factionalism by controlling the
behavior of public officials); Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63
TEX. L. REV. 207 (1984) (discussing ways that the structure of government and the nature
of administrative law combine to influence administrators to respond to broad segments of
the public).
47. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) for a famous early statement of
this requirement.
48. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
40-48 (1983); Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1985).
49. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984). See generally Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG.
283 (1986).
[Vol. 24:539
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ceptability to Congress and the public. If sufficiently displeased,
Congress may change the statute. The public may change the
administration.
Administrative law recognizes, however, that political ac-
countability is not always to be trusted. Due process considera-
tions have long forbidden the assignment of decisions to individuals
having an interest in the outcome." Indeed, it is a felony for any
federal officer to participate in a decision in which he or she has
a financial interest." These barriers to interested decisionmakers
do not depend on proof of any actual effect on outcomes, in light of
needs both to prevent harm and to preserve public confidence in
government. The underlying premise is that personal interest
places unacceptable stress on the integrity of public
decisionmaking.
D. The Limits of Prosecutorial Discretion
Turning to prosecution, we find that the executive generally
enjoys very broad discretion. The Supreme Court has emphasized
that "the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial
review. '"52 And decisions not to prosecute are presumptively unre-
viewable in court, because they involve judgments about priorities
that may be fully understood only in the context of the full range of
choices and resources available to the agency. 3 Thus, the primary
control on the fairness of decisions whether to prosecute is the
political accountability of the prosecutor. Nevertheless, as with ad-
ministrative law generally, prosecutors are expected to recuse
50. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (state board of optometry,
made up of private practitioner optometrists, sought to exclude corporate employee optom-
etrists from practicing); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (mayor as
judicial officer for traffic offenses with power to impose fines and thus add to the city's
treasury).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1982). The Standards of Conduct of the Department of Justice
forbid employees to participate in decisions in which they have a financial interest. 28
C.F.R. § 45.735-5 (1987). The Standards also generally forbid employees to participate in
criminal investigations or prosecutions if they have a "personal or political relationship"
with the targets. Id. § 45.735-4(a). Disqualifying personal relationships are those that are
"normally viewed as likely to induce partiality." Id. § 45.735-4(c)(2). Political ones involve
"close identification" with an elected officeholder or candidate. Id. § 45.735-4(c)(1).
52. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). The Court explained: "Such
factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Govern-
ment's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall en-
forcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent
to undertake." Id.
53. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832-33.
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themselves in situations of personal interest.5 4 For example, the
Attorney General voluntarily requested the appointment of an in-
dependent counsel to investigate the Iran/Contra affair, under a
provision of the Act authorizing him to do so in situations of "per-
sonal, financial, or political conflict of interest."
' 5
Two additional considerations suggest that the constitutional-
ity of independent counsel should not be approached via a formalis-
tic analysis that is geared to preserving political accountability.
First, investigation of high level misconduct does not involve an
ordinary exercise of prosecutorial discretion, for which interference
with executive branch priority setting might be very troubling. In-
stead, credible allegations of serious criminal activity by senior ex-
ecutives may reasonably be given automatic high priority, in view
of the importance of public confidence in the integrity of govern-
ment. Surely, we would not have expected the Attorney General to
respond to the Iran/Contra scandal by arguing that the Depart-
ment could not pursue the matter, in light of the need to devote its
limited resources to prosecuting those who traffic in contraband
dentures. 56
Second, accountability depends on information if it is to be
effective. The courts, Congress, and the public can evaluate only
those executive decisions for which the basis of decision is known. 7
Criminal prosecutions present no insurmountable monitoring
problems, because the trial exposes information about both the
crime and (at least inferentially) the soundness of the charging deci-
sion. In contrast, decisions not to prosecute are very difficult to
oversee. They are presumptively unreviewable in court, and claims
of executive privilege may bar attempts by Congress and the public
to examine them."1 Moreover, when executive misconduct is sus-
pected, there is reason for special concern about both the possible
54. See supra note 51.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 591(c)(2); see also In re Sealed Case (North), 829 F.2d 50, 51 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34, 42 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div. 1987).
56. For the federal criminal law of dentures, see 18 U.S.C. § 1821 (1982) (last pol-
ished by Congress in 1948; 62 Stat. 786).
57. Of course, for some executive functions such as foreign relations and national
defense, information must be channeled carefully. For example, some information is pro-
vided only to select congressional committees or to courts reviewing it in camera, and some
information is held entirely within the executive.
58. For an overview of executive privilege and an example of a protracted dispute
between the executive and Congress over review of enforcement policy, see P. SHANE & H.
BRUFE, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 162-208 (1988).
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guilt of the target and the bona fides of the decision to forego prose-
cution. Allegations of a Watergate-style coverup are easy to make
and hard to refute to the satisfaction of the public.
III. APPLYING FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS TO THE ETHICS IN
GOVERNMENT ACT
Hence some dilution of executive branch responsibility for
prosecution of high-level crime seems permissible. Critical ques-
tions remain, however: how much dilution, and of what kinds?
Functional analysis focuses on these questions, balancing the na-
ture and extent of interference with the power of one branch
against the purposes that justify the legislative scheme. 9
In addition, there is a need to make inquiries that define the
legitimacy of any power exercised within the bureaucracy-
whether the nature and strength of the relationships between an
officer executing the law and the three constitutional branches are
sufficient to ensure preservation of the rule of law.' ° To evaluate the
independent counsel statute, I will focus on three central attributes
of control over prosecutors: their appointment, supervision, and
removal.
A. Appointment
The appointments clause of the Constitution authorizes the
appointment of unspecified "inferior Officers" by the President
59. Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg's dissent in Olson cogently summarized the approach
of the Supreme Court's most recent functional decision, Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, which
concerned a displacement of judicial power:
Schor's separation of powers analysis turns on the nature and extent of the
intrusion, or siphoning off, and the purpose it is designed to serve: "Among the
factors upon which we have focused are the extent to which the 'essential attrib-
utes of judicial power' are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the
extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and
powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and importance of
the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart from
the requirements of Article III." 106 S. Ct. at 3258. In the context of removing
certain matters from the executive, rather than judicial, branch, Schor's approach
counsels a consideration of three factors: the extent of the removal, whether the
limitation affects a core executive function, and the purposes of the legislation.
Olson, 838 F.2d at 525 (footnote omitted).
60. See generally Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government. Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984) (argues in favor of abandoning a
rigid separation of powers compartmentalization of government functions and replacing it
with an analysis of separation of functions and checks and balances); Bruff, supra note 46.
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alone, the heads of departments, or the courts.6' Because the Act
calls for judicial appointment of independent counsel, controversy
surrounds whether they are inferior officers in the constitutional
sense. In Ex parte Siebold,62 the Court upheld a statute placing
appointment of election supervisors in the courts. Congress was
trying to enforce the fifteenth amendment by extending broad fed-
eral oversight to state regulation of elections to federal office. 63 The
supervisors were to monitor elections for fraud or interference; they
could register or challenge voters. The Court rejected an argument
that the clause should be read according to strict separation of
powers principles, so that the courts could appoint only judicial
officers, and not those having executive functions.64
61. The appointments clause provides that the President
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
62. 100 U.S. 371 (1880). See generally 7 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-1888, 472-80
(Part 2 1987).
63. T. EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 896-97 (2d ed. 1987).
64. It is no doubt usual and proper to vest the appointment of inferior officers
in that department of the government, executive or judicial . . . to which the
duties of such officers appertain. But there is no absolute requirement to this
effect in the Constitution; and, if there were, it would be difficult in many cases to
determine to which department an office properly belonged. Take that of mar-
shal, for instance. He is an executive officer, whose appointment, in ordinary
cases, is left to the President and Senate. But if Congress should, as it might, vest
the appointment elsewhere, it would be questionable whether it should be in the
President alone, in the Department of Justice, or in the courts. The marshal is
pre-eminently the officer of the courts ....
But as the Constitution stands, the selection of the appointing power, as between
the functionaries named, is a matter resting in the discretion of Congress. And,
looking at the subject in a practical light, it is perhaps better that it should rest
there, than that the country should be harassed by the endless controversies to
which a more specific direction on this subject might have given rise. The obser-
vation in the case of [In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 258 (1839)], that the
appointing power in the clause referred to "was no doubt intended to be exercised
by the department of the government to which the official to be appointed most
appropriately belonged," was not intended to define the constitutional power of
Congress in this regard, but rather to express the law or rule by which it should
be governed .... But the duty to appoint inferior officers, when required thereto
by law, is a constitutional duty of the courts; and in the present case there is. no
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The Siebold Court included a caveat, however, noting that
there was "no such incongruity" in the duty imposed on the courts
as to invalidate the statute. Much has been made of this in the
independent counsel litigation. The challengers have argued that
having judges appoint prosecutors is unconstitutionally "incongru-
ous," because this particular erosion of separation of powers threat-
ens liberty.65 This is a serious charge. Appraising it requires
attention to the Act's exact allocation of appointive powers.
The Ethics in Government Act balances the dangers of un-
derdeterring and overdeterring executive activity that might lead to
criminal prosecution. As noted above, leaving investigation of high
level crime to ordinary executive procedures may produce too few
prosecutions. Stripping the executive of all control may produce
too many.66 Here a critical feature of the Act is its grant to the
Attorney General of unreviewable threshold discretion to terminate
the investigation. 67 This serves the executive's strong need to pro-
tect against baseless prosecutions, so that courageous decisionmak-
ing will not be chilled.68
An unfortunate consequence of this unreviewable discretion is
to preserve some opportunity for a coverup, because decisions not
such incongruity in the duty required as to excuse the courts from its perform-
ance, or to render their acts void. It cannot be affirmed that the appointment of
the officers in question could, with any greater propriety, and certainly not with
equal regard to convenience, have been assigned to any other depositary of official
power capable of exercising it. Neither the President, nor any head of depart-
ment, could have been equally competent to the task.
Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397-98.
65. The Olson majority thought that if the appointment of inferior officers were not
restricted to their own branch, no principled limits could be stated, so that the courts could
be authorized to appoint the Secretary of State. 838 F.2d at 494-95. That example per-
fectly illustrates the possibility of an unacceptable "incongruity"; it is also remote enough
from the independent counsel context to suggest that workable distinctions can be made. I
will confine my discussion to the case at hand.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
67. The courts may not review either decisions not to conduct preliminary investiga-
tions or decisions not to apply for appointment of independent counsel. See supra note 29
and accompanying text.
68. Compare the parallel policy of the tort immunity cases, discussed supra at text
accompanying notes 22-25. The 1982 reauthorization of the Act removed the original re-
quirement that the Attorney General apply for an independent counsel unless he could
state that "the matter is so unsubstantiated that no further investigation or prosecution is
warranted," because it led to investigation of cases not ordinarily prosecuted by the De-
partment of Justice. S. REP. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3537, 3550-51. See also supra note 31, reporting re-
lated efforts in 1982 to clarify applicability of the Department's policies to the activities of
independent counsel.
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to prosecute are so difficult to monitor. Here, our ultimate protec-
tion probably lies with the press, which displays high levels of inter-
est and aggressiveness when government corruption is alleged.
Given the rather low threshold that governs the Attorney General's
decision to apply for an independent counsel,69 it is difficult to jus-
tify terminating an investigation that appears to have a basis. An
additional constraint lies in the Act's requirement that the Attor-
ney General notify the Special Division that a preliminary investi-
gation is being terminated without applying for the appointment of
an independent counsel. This notification must be accompanied by
a summary of the investigation's results, which the court may dis-
close to the public.7 °
Regarding the role of the courts in appointing independent
counsel, the issue is whether the Act grants courts a power that is
"incongruous" with the judicial role. History suggests not. The
separation between prosecution and adjudication has never been
absolute. Federal judges have traditionally played a limited role in
prosecution, by approving search warrants and supervising grand
juries.71 Moreover, in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils
S.A.,72 the Court recently upheld the "inherent" power of federal
courts to appoint private attorneys to prosecute contempts of their
orders. The Court thought this power necessary to the indepen-
dence of the judiciary, notwithstanding its potential for undermin-
ing the core function of neutral adjudication.73 In contrast, under
the Act courts possess no roving commission to initiate prosecu-
tions on their own.74 Therefore, threats to neutrality and to liberty
69. See supra text accompanying note 28. Thus, some overdeterrence problems re-
main, due to the prospect for continuing thinly based investigations that would ordinarly be
dismissed. A compensating factor is the need for public confidence in the integrity of se-
nior officials.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(2); id. § 593(g). In the absence of such reporting and disclo-
sure mechanisms, the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. IV),
might require disclosure of the contents of a preliminary investigation. Litigation would
probably be necessary, however, and the court would balance the public and private inter-
ests involved, leading to indeterminate results. See generally Vaughn, Open Government
Laws and Public Employment Provisions, 32 BUFFALO L. REV. 465, 506-10 (1983).
71. See generally Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49-52 (1959), noting that
judges summon witnesses to the grand jury, and bring the contempt power to bear on
recalcitrant witnesses.
72. 107 S. Ct. 2124 (1987).
73. Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, argued that the contempt power
should depend on the willingness of the executive branch to prosecute. Id. at 2141-47.
74. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom.
Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965), holding that a district court could not order a United
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should be much less than under the scheme approved in Young.
B. Supervision
Like appointment, supervision of an independent counsel is di-
vided between the Attorney General and the Special Division. They
share responsibility for defining the jurisdiction of an independent
counsel, whose daily operations are then free of supervision by
either, except for the possibility of removal or termination of the
office. The Attorney General's application for appointment of an
independent counsel guides the Special Division's jurisdictional
grant." There is some ambiguity here, however, due to the court's
power to define the jurisdiction as "all matters related" to those in
the application.76 The court of appeals approved the Special Divi-
sion's expansion of the jurisdiction requested by the Attorney Gen-
eral in the Iran/Contra affair.7 Yet in Olson the Special Division
declined to grant the independent counsel's application for an ex-
pansion that the Attorney General had refused to approve. 7  The
overall result seems sound-the Attorney General retains the
power to forbid investigations that appear to be baseless, and the
court has the flexibility to define an independent counsel's jurisdic-
tion in ways that are compatible with the Attorney General's re-
quest and that will avoid hypertechnical objections about
jurisdiction from defendants.
Once empowered, an independent counsel is subject to few
constraints. Surely, the most troubling aspect of the Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act is the specter of a rogue prosecutor, with license to
States Attorney to draft or sign indictments as requested by the grand jury. 342 F.2d at
172.
75. The prosecutorial jurisdiction can only be properly defined if the Attorney
General provides complete and detailed information to the court about the true
nature of the allegations of criminal wrongdoing, any related criminal investiga-
tion which are [sic] presently being conducted by the Department, and any infor-
mation or leads collected as a result of the preliminary investigation which would
indicate the potential that further investigation will involve additional related
matters.
S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4217, 4273.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(3); see supra note 30.
77. In re Sealed Case (North), 829 F.2d 50. The Attorney General subsequently rati-
fied the expansion by making a parallel appointment of the independent counsel in the same
terms as the court's jurisdictional grant, in an effort to pretermit constitutional doubts
about the investigation. Id. at 52-53.
78. In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34.
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trample the rights of those within the jurisdictional orbit. To evalu-
ate this possibility, let us compare the pursuit of executive miscon-
duct under the Act with the situation in its absence. The Act
attempts to correct incentives for the Attorney General to under-
prosecute-does it create incentives for an independent counsel to
overprosecute?
Without the Act, the Attorney General would have one reason
to prosecute executive officers more stringently than other suspects:
to demonstrate his own integrity, or that of the administration. Es-
pecially in a post-Watergate world, this consideration may play a
role. It seems, however, likely to be overborne by competing incen-
tives. The most powerful is probably the personal and political loy-
alty that exists in any administration. In the rough and tumble of
politics, there is never a shortage of outsiders attributing evil char-
acter to important officials. Reaction by insiders is only natural.
Even absent the siege mentality that develops in times of crisis,
such as Watergate, senior Department of Justice officials display
attitudes of protectiveness toward their colleagues in the
administration.
Moreover, many allegations of executive misconduct involve
"abuse of office" crimes, as in Olson and the Iran/Contra affair.
Here, as both cases illustrate, three factors deter full prosecution.
First, suspicion often surrounds not one isolated official, who might
be sacrificed to preserve public confidence, but a group of high offi-
cials. The reputation of the administration as a whole may be in
question. Second, each of the four scandals in this century has in-
volved the Department of Justice, with allegations of personal mis-
conduct on the part of the Attorney General. Third, a background
of interbranch conflict with Congress may exacerbate executive
branch defensiveness.7 9 All of these disincentives to prosecute are
strongest at the highest levels of the Justice Department, but they
would influence other political appointees as well, such as the As-
sistant Attorneys General.
Has the creation of the independent counsel overcompensated
for these problems? The Olson majority credited arguments of the
challengers that counsel have incentives to overprosecute, for two
79. Indeed, the allegations of false testimony to Congress in Olson stem from a pro-
tracted, often bitter, controversy over congressional demands for enforcement documents
of the Environmental Protection Agency, which the Department of Justice resisted with
claims of executive privilege. The story is told in P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, supra note 58, at
187-200.
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reasons."0 First, they need to justify their existence, in view of the
time and money involved in an investigation. Second, their focus on
a single transaction deprives them of the perspective of the Depart-
ment's seasoned prosecutors, who are protected from obsession
with a particular case by the need to place it in context with others.
This frame of reference helps to ensure that only cases meriting
prosecution under prevailing standards will be pursued.
These are serious yet unpersuasive arguments. The self-justifi-
cation hypothesis is not borne out by the record to date."' Further,
there is an offsetting incentive: the prospect of professional embar-
rassment from the much greater loss of time and money that at-
tends an unsuccessful criminal prosecution. Congress has made
clear its desire that the Justice Department's policies bind most de-
cisions by independent counsel. 12 These policies state that prosecu-
tion should be initiated only when "the government believes that
the person probably will be found guilty by an unbiased trier of
fact." 3 A counsel appearing to ignore this directive should expect
criticism. Also, the constraints of conscience should affect the deci-
sion to prosecute.
As for perspective, analysis above suggests the wisdom of the
Act's premise that allegations of executive misconduct distort ordi-
nary prosecutorial judgment in the Department. In addition, there
may be disruption of structural arrangements in the Department
that normally foster consistency. This problem stems from the
comprehensive strictures against conflict of interest that govern all
the Department's lawyers.8 4 In a given investigation, recusals may
80. Olson, 838 F.2d at 509-10.
81. Since the Act's inception, four cases have concluded without indictment (Jordan,
Kraft, Donovan, Meese). Two (Deaver, Nofziger) have produced both indictment and con-
viction. Others pend at this writing. See Washington Post, Feb. 23, 1988, at A4, col. 1.
82. See supra note 31.
83. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-27.220 (1987). The Olson majority
noted that the Iran/Contra counsel had espoused a looser standard, by which he should
prosecute "if he finds probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed .......
Olson, 838 F.2d at 510. The courts should correct any such misapprehension.
84. See supra note 51. In addition, the Department has applied to its attorneys the
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-1(b) (1987), whose
numerous provisions relating to conflict of interest are summarized in Young, 107 S. Ct. at
2135 n.14 (holding that although courts could appoint private attorneys to prosecute con-
tempts of their orders, appointing the attorney for one of the parties to the earlier litigation
created an intolerable conflict of interest). See also Kramer & Smith, The Special Prosecutor
Act: Proposals for 1983, 66 MINN. L. REV. 963, 985-87 (1982) (discussing the application
of the ABA standards to the Department).
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substantially alter the normal chain of command. 5
Of course, recusal may ameliorate the personal and political
conflicts of interest that gave rise to the Act. Nevertheless, no
political appointee charged with investigating a senior member of
the administration is wholly free of such conflicts. Moreover, the
goal of ensuring public confidence in investigations is unlikely to be
met. Whatever the bureaucratic arrangements, the public may be-
lieve that a subordinate in the Department is under implicit pres-
sure to clear a high official.
Opponents of the independent counsel often imply that
prosecutorial discretion is ordinarily exercised under highly cen-
tralized control in the executive branch. 6 Therefore, the argument
runs, the Act deeply invades core executive responsibilities. In fact,
from the nation's founding to the present, decisions to prosecute
particular cases have been rather decentralized in the executive. In
the early years, federal prosecutors were largely independent, oper-
ating under the loose control of the Secretary of State.87 Today, the
United States Attorneys retain considerable autonomy, the exact
extent of which is a matter of bureaucratic politics within the De-
partment of Justice."8 Within this structure, delicate questions sur-
round the degree of supervision over individual prosecutions that
senior officials in the Department and the White House should ex-
ercise.8 9 The competing considerations are the potential for a case
to raise important issues of national policy, most properly resolved
85. For example, the Department recently announced its decision that no independ-
ent counsel would be sought regarding allegations against former Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Douglas Ginsburg. The decision was made by another Assistant Attorney General,
fifth in rank in the Department, because all higher-ranked officers had recused themselves.
Washington Post, Feb. 11, 1988, at Al, col. 4-5, to A6, col. 1.
86. See e.g., Olson, 838 F.2d at 488. The majority in Olson stated: "The Executive
has 'exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.'
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 .. " Id. This citation is, to say the least, ironic
in view of the fact that the Court in Nixon allowed the Special Prosecutor to contest the
President's view of the executive's needs relating to a pending prosecution.
87. L. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 406-11
(1948). In 1831, Attorney General Taney opined that the President could discharge a
United States Attorney if he refused to discontinue a prosecution that hindered foreign
policy, although the President could not himself dismiss the case. The Jewels of the Prin-
cess of Orange, 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 482.
88. D. MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE 138-40, 145-46 (1980).
89. Id. at 27-36. Indeed, constitutional concerns now surround the extent of appro-
priate political responsiveness of the United States Attorneys. See Branti v. Finkel, 445
U.S. 507, 524-25 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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by high officials, and the threat that political pressure on prosecu-
tors will invade individual liberties or subvert the public interest.
Obviously, these tradeoffs are especially sensitive in cases involving
high level crime.
In United States v. Nixon, 9° the Court upheld the fragmenta-
tion of authority over a pending prosecution within the executive,
rejecting the President's claim that he possessed exclusive constitu-
tional authority to decide whether government evidence needed in
a pending prosecution should be supplied. Since the President's im-
mediate subordinates faced charges for which he had been named
an unindicted co-conspirator, the conflict of interest overtones to
the dispute were manifest. The Court's treatment of the issue was
conclusory and unilluminating. 9 Nevertheless, Nixon stands for
the proposition that appropriate exceptions to plenary executive
branch control of prosecution can be crafted, at least in situations
presenting disabling conflicts of interest.
Still, the executive retains supervisory needs in cases involving
official misconduct. These fall into two broad categories. One is to
preserve policymaking prerogatives that are distinct from the
charging decision. For example, an independent' counsel's attempt
to subpoena the Canadian Ambassador recently provoked State
Department objections that the executive's foreign policy powers
had been infringed. 92 The other need, which I have discussed, is to
forestall baseless prosecutions of Officials. Both can be satisfied
under the Act's present structure.
Litigation unrelated to the Act routinely involves claims by
the executive that information in its possession should not be dis-
closed, or that the court should defer to the executive's substantive
policy judgments. 93 For example, courts review whether docu-
ments have been properly classified, and determine whether claims
of the state secrets privilege should be honored.94 Similarly, the
executive asks courts to honor its judgment that the Act of State
doctrine should bar inquiry into the actions of a foreign govern-
ment, or that a certain foreign government should be recognized as
90. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
91. See generally Symposium, United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1974).
92. See Olson, 838 F.2d at 503.
93. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (validity of Iranian
hostage settlement); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1952) (availability of govern-
ment information in tort litigation).
94. See generally P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, supra note 58, at 154-56.
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legitimate." Although the courts often defer to these executive
judgments, they retain their power to "say what the law is." 96
Thus, the executive must submit many of its positions to judicial
resolution, even when national security or foreign policy is in-
volved. The Act preserves the executive's opportunity to present
its views on such issues.97 In most situations, the Constitution re-
quires no more.
C. Removal
The executive's ultimate protection for its constitutional pre-
rogatives lies in the power to remove an independent counsel who
will not honor them. Indeed, in Bowsher v. Synar the Court
equated removal power with control of an officer for separation of
powers purposes." Therefore, the Act's removal provisions are
central to the constitutionality of the scheme. The Attorney Gen-
eral may remove an independent counsel for "good cause," subject
to judicial review. 99 The legislative history rather disingenuously
explains that the "good cause" standard is meant to invoke existing
law on the removal of independent officers."° This body of "law,"
however, consists entirely of speculation by observers on what
might suffice to justify a removal, because Presidents have not as-
serted specific cause when removals have actually occurred.' 0'
Therefore, the ambiguity of the statutory text and its history might
best be viewed as an invitation to the courts to allow removal for
reasons necessary to the Act's constitutionality and consistent with
its efficacy. But what does that mean?
95. See T. FRANCK & M. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECUR-
ITY LAW 211-14, 443-59 (1987).
96. The quote, of course, is from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803), and often appears in place of analysis when a court asserts its power to decide a
question that could be allocated to one of the other branches. See, e.g., United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703; see also Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy:
The Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process, 22 UCLA L. REV. 30, 34 (1974) ("[T]here
is nothing in Marbury ... that precludes a constitutional interpretation which gives final
authority to another branch").
97. 28 U.S.C. § 597(b) confirms the Attorney General's authority to appear as amicus
curiae in cases involving independent counsel.
98. The court stated: "Once an officer is appointed, it is only the authority that can
remove him, and not the authority that appointed him, that he must fear and, in the per-
formance of his functions, obey." Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. at 3188 (quoting Synar v.
United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1401 (D.D.C. 1986)).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 596; see also supra note 32.
100. See supra note 32.
101. See generally P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, supra note 58, at 290-327.
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The legislative history of the removal provision does say that
counsel must not be removed for defying executive orders that
would compromise the integrity of the proceedings, such as an or-
der to grant unwarranted immunity to the targets of the investiga-
tion. °2 On a facial challenge to the Act, it should be enough to
read this statement to allow removal for either of two grounds: in-
terference with the executive's independent constitutional preroga-
tives, for example in foreign policy, or pursuit of a baseless
prosecution. 103 Of course, either kind of removal could threaten
the "integrity of the proceedings" and the efficacy of the Act.
Here, judicial review of an actual removal would play a critical
role. Thus, an examination of the nature of judicial review is
necessary.
Given the Bowsher Court's equation of removal power with
constitutional control of an officer, judicial review must tread a nar-
row line. Too little, and the Act's central purpose to guarantee a
degree of independence from the executive is vitiated; too much,
and the reins pass to the judiciary, creating severe separation of
powers difficulties by vesting executive functions in courts. The Ol-
son majority characterized judicial review under the Act as de novo
in nature, and therefore concluded that the court's powers over
counsel were excessively supervisory. " This reading conflicts with
the Act's legislative history. 105 Instead, courts should apply the fa-
miliar standard of "arbitrary and capricious" review under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA). 0 6 The APA standard would
govern review in the absence of a special statutory standard. The
102. 28 U.S.C. § 596; see also supra note 32.
103. The latter ground for removal would protect the executive's constitutional
power to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Of
course, the President retains his ultimate pardon power. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. See
generally P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, supra note 58, at 439-43.
104. Olson, 838 F.2d at 501-02.
105. In deciding that removal of a special prosecutor should only be for the
causes described above, and should only be accomplished by the personal action
of the Attorney General, the Committee was attempting to balance the need for
independence for a special prosecutor with the desire, for constitutional and other
reasons, that the division of the court not be engaged in supervision of the special
prosecutor. In order to exercise the removal power, a certain degree of supervi-
sion is required and the Committee felt it appropriate that this supervision be
conducted by the Attorney General, who is a member of the executive branch of
the government.
S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 73 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4217, 4289.
106. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1982).
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Act's most recent reauthorization called for existing law to
apply. 107
Accordingly, courts should inquire whether a removal "was
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there
has been a clear error of judgment."' ° Because this style of review
is restrained, and is not supposed to substitute the court's judgment
for that of the administrator, concerns about the constitutionality
of the judicial role should be laid to rest. At the same time, the
courts would provide a check on the Attorney General by review-
ing the justification provided for a removal. The risk that the Act's
purposes might still be undermined by the threat of removals based
on the minimum support necessary to survive judicial review seems
illusory in light of the political furor that is likely to follow any
debatable removal.
Incorporating the existing APA standard would follow the
tradition of interpreting statutes in ways that preserve their consti-
tutionality.10 9 The same approach should be taken to interpreting
the power of the Special Division to terminate an independent
counsel. The legislative history emphasizes that this authority is
meant to apply only to a "runaway" counsel, and is not to displace
the principal allocation of removal power to the executive.l11
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, the Ethics in Government Act should satisfy a func-
tional analysis. It leaves enough power in the executive for the dis-
charge of its core constitutional responsibilities. Further, the sum
of controls vested in the executive and the courts should adequately
bind independent counsel to law. However, they still possess a
large amount of discretion. Nevertheless, some highly important
107. 28 U.S.C. § 596; see supra note 32.
108. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); see
also G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 165-79
(3d ed. 1986).
109. The statutory standard applicable at the time Olson was decided, allowing rever-
sal for "error of law or fact," 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(3) (Supp. III 1985), could easily be con-
formed to the APA standard.
110. "This paragraph provides for the unlikely situation where a special prosecutor
may try to remain as special prosecutor after his responsibilities under this chapter are
completed.... The drastic remedy of terminating the office of special prosecutor without
the consent of the special prosecutor should obviously be exercised with caution." S. REP.
No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4217, 4291.
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functions in our government are committed to officers who are
largely independent of daily supervision by any of the three
branches. A few examples will help to place the Act in a broader
perspective. If it is unconstitutional, many other statutes may be as
well.
The current challenge to the Act occurs against a background
of controversy about the constitutionality of independent agen-
cies. I Il They perform important executive tasks free of plenary
presidential supervision. A prominent example is the Federal Re-
serve Board's central role in the economy."12  Other independent
officers are scattered throughout the government, often in watch-
dog roles that can be analogized to the independent counsel." 3 Ex-
amples include the Comptroller General"' and the Inspectors
General. " 5
The Supreme Court has linked the appropriate independence
of officers to the nature of the functions they perform. " I6 This sug-
gests that permissible kinds and degrees of independence must ordi-
narily be decided in the context of a particular administrative
scheme, not by sweeping generalizations about the separation of
powers. 7 This Article is one such particularistic effort; the others
must wait for another day.
111. See generally Symposium, The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Administra-
tive Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 277 (1987); Symposium, Bowsher v. Synar, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 421 (1987); Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SuP. CT. REV. 41 (1987); Verkuil,
The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779.
112. See generally W. MELTON, INSIDE THE FED (1985).
113. See generally Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on
Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U.L. REV. 59 (1983).
114. See Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181.
115. INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. § 3 (1982).
116. See, e.g., Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 352-53 (1958) (War Claims
Commissioner not removable at will of President despite lack of statutory restriction, be-
cause adjudicative functions require independence).
117. See Strauss, supra note 37; Bruff, supra note 33.
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